Quantitative Techniques for Competition and Antitrust Analysis. Peter Davis, Eliana Garces

Quantitative Techniques for Competition and Antitrust Analysis


Quantitative.Techniques.for.Competition.and.Antitrust.Analysis.pdf
ISBN: 0691142572,9780691142579 | 593 pages | 15 Mb


Download Quantitative Techniques for Competition and Antitrust Analysis



Quantitative Techniques for Competition and Antitrust Analysis Peter Davis, Eliana Garces
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Jan 17, 2014 - antitrust enforcement. Apr 12, 2010 - Peter Davis, Eliana Garces, "Quantitative Techniques for Competition and Antitrust Analysis" Princeton University Press | 2009 | ISBN: 0691142572 | 560 pages | PDF | 2,1 MB. In the context of selective distribution, this shift had been already begun by the ECJ; in the leading case, Metro 1, the Court held that a simple selective distribution system would not infringe Article 101(1).5 This was crucial because,. However, they usually neglect that the prosecution of competition law infringements can Quantitative Techniques for Competition and Antitrust Analysis, pp. Nov 21, 2013 - economics-based approach to antitrust law generally, but for present purposes it is Both motivations affect the following legal techniques to facilitate intervention: finding that the restriction is by object; skipping an analysis of the competition Law.4. (at least) full compensation for the harm suffered. Posted on The Intensive Course on Quantitative Methods for Competition Analysis will provide participants economists, lawyers and practitioners working for. Nov 4, 2013 - Quantitative Techniques For Competition And Antitrust. Academics and competition authorities support this goal with guidance for the calculation of cartel damages. Effective private enforcement requires that cartel victims can receive. Apr 19, 2014 - The consent agreement in this matter settles alleged violations of federal law prohibiting unfair methods of competition. The attached 1 The Merger Guidelines also contemplate a number of quantitative analyses to facilitate the analysis of potential unilateral effects including calculating diversion ratios and the value of diverted sales. Tucker, A Survey of Evidence Leading to Second Requests at the FTC, 78 Antitrust L.J.